Karel Köcher

„Vyjdu z budovy na 47. ulici, kde byla ta kancelář. Před ní stála černá limuzína a obklopili mě - že se mnou chtějí mluvit a že mi chtějí udělat nabídku, FBI. Jestli bych jel s nimi. Nezatkli mě, jestli bych jel s nimi. Viděl jsem, jak mě obklopili, bylo to takové zastrašovací. Nepošlete je do hajzlu - chtějí mi udělat nabídku. V té době jsem se chystal do Rakouska a nevěděl jsem, čím se tam budu živit. Odvezli mě do jednoho z nejluxusnějších hotelů v New Yorku, Barbizon Plaza. Tam měla Sofia Loren apartmá a tak, ultra ultra! Tam měli suite. Tam seděl kontrarozvědčík FBI, docela příjemný člověk, a šéf kontrarozvědky CIA . A teď mi povídají, že vědí o mé spolupráci… Věděli spoustu detailů mojí práce, až to hezký nebylo. To mohli mít od Fily, ale nemyslím si, že mě Fila prásknul. Dozvěděli se to od Kalugina a od něj šli na Filu a ten si myslel když jsem proti režimu v Praze, tak budu spolupracovat. Domnívám se, že tak to bylo. A oni byli taky přesvědčení, že mě otočili, že jsem v konfliktu s Prahou. Udělali mi nabídku. Nabídli mi, že mě nechají odjet do Rakouska a že mi dají smlouvu spolupracovníka CIA a odtamtud můžu pracovat proti režimu v Praze.“

„Doporučovalo se, koho verbovat, nebo neverbovat, to byl jeden z hlavních cílů, objevit takové ty měkčé povahy, které by bylo možné zmáčnout, nebo by byli úplatní. Takže tam byla zároveň možnost torpédovat ty verbovky. To mi vyhovovalo, protože si myslím, že Američané se chovají velice ošklivě ke svým agentům, protože když jim to někdo podepíše a pracuje pro ně, tak se vystavuje obrovskému riziku, ne jenom zatčení, ale vůbec zničení všeho, rodiny, a oni se o něj nepostarají potom. Bylo mi opravdu potěšením torpédovat ty verbovky. Nebo když někdo odjížděl do Afriky, do Ugandy nebo kam, tak že tam budou chtít někoho verbovat, někoho kdo tam jel jako tlumočník, takže už jsem mohl varovat, koho chtějí verbovat. Já bych to teoreticky neměl vědět, ale všichni byli upovídaní a všichni mi to vykládali, takže to nebyl problém zjist.“

„Detektor lži. Dneska je to už asi jiný, dneska už bych je asi neošálil. Jistě budou daleko dokonalejší. To se odbylo za jedno odpoledne. Tady byl nějakej major Dufek, to byl psychiatr, pracoval v Krakovské ulici, tam mělo vnitro zdravotní zařízení. On tam měl laboratoř, kde si postavil vlastníma rukama detektor lži. Pomáhal mu v tom nějaký americký desátník, který zběhnul, dělal předtím asistenta u výslechů na detektoru lži a potom požádal o azyl v Československu. On si tedy postavil ten detektor lži, obludný zařízení, neměl polovidiče, čipy, ale lampy, ale všechno ostatní bylo. Dával mi na prsty ty náramky, okolo prsou pás, jak dýchám, jak se potím. Prostě me naučil tu techniku a vysvětlil mi jak to obejít. Musíte mít silnou vůli a musíte mít předpoklady, ale jde to.“ „A co je ta technika?“ „Technika je vícenásobná. Když se má určit základní úroveň, od který se vypočítává to vzrušení, že lžete, tak to ta úroveň už musí být dost vysoká, že to lhaní už to moc nevychýlí. Takže když se mě ptal na nějaký základní věci, kde jsem se narodil, kam jsem chodil do základní školy, tak už jsem si představoval, že lžu a snažil jsem se být co nejnervóznější. Tak to je první fáze. Další fáze je, když vám dává otázky, jestli jste příslušníkem cizí rozvědky, tak si představujete něco, krásnou alpskou louku, něbo že jíte něco dobrýho, něco co vás nevzrušuje, ale uklidňuje. To je ta síla soustředění.“

„Přišli ke mně domů, ohlásil se Gvozdek, on vedl protišpionážní oddělení proti Němcům, ale byl pověřený mým výcvikem ve špionážním řemesle. Řekl: ,Karle, přijdu k vám ještě s jedním člověkem.’ Přišel s jedním rozvědčíkem, sedli si u mě, udělal jsem jim kafe a povídá, že pro mě mají návrh. To byl rok 1964. ,Chceme Vás vyslat do Spojených států.’ Cituju doslova. A já jsem řekl: ,Co tam budu dělat?' ,Proniknete do CIA.' Potlačil jsem tedy úsměv, on neuměl anglicky, o Americe neměl tušení, ale byl to hodnej, čestnej člověk. A tak jsem se ptal, jak to mám udělat? On řekl: ,To bude vaše věc, Karle.' A tím to skončilo. Ševela k tomu připsal ,vystuduješ vysokou školu a to ti otevře brány.’ Ta sprostota od toho Ševely, rozumíte mi. Tak to nebylo, to byl absurdní návrh, jenže ta absurdita... To je jako když vám někdo navrhne, abyste skočil z velké výšky do vody. Uděláte to? Nebo zvedat těžkou činku. Já jsem vzpíral. To je prostě - hec. Udělám to? To snad není možný. Tím jsem samozřejmě pohřbil všechny seriozní kariéry a stal se ze mě dobrodruh.“ „Dobrodruh?“ „Dobrodruh. V prvé radě, když máte takovouto identitu - moje skutečná identita byla rozvědčík - i když učíte filozofii na americký vysoký škole, tak jste v první řadě rozvědčík, protože vás kdykoli můžou sebrat, a musíte neustále uspořádávat svůj život a neustále se ohlížet za rameno. Vaše identita je tahle. Jste secret agent, nejste profesor. Profesor jste až potom.“

„Vladivoj Tomek byl… Nerad o tom mluvím, protože já o Vladivojovi nemůžu nic moc dobrého říct. Skončil hrozně. On byl jeden z těch devíti, které poslali do francouzského gymnázia, předtím chodil na LaGuardiovo gymnázium v Holešovicích, jenže Vladivoj byl ze všech těch devíti nejméně schopný se tomu přizpůsobit. Samé čtyřky, franština vůbec, matika čtyřky. On byl trochu obézní, asi měl cukrovku, rodina rozvrácená, žil s matkou, která… Jednou jsem tam u nich byl, byla opilá. Dost hrozný. V té škole byla většina holek, jen pár kluků, samý holky a všechny krásné, z bohatých rodin prvorepublikových prominentů. On neměl vůbec žádnou šanci, já jsem nějakou měl, moje první dívka byla jedna ze spolužaček, ale Tomkovi to dávali sežrat. On ještě zapáchal, asi byl nemocnej, nikdo vedle něj nebyl ochotný sedět. To byl kámen úrazu. Zdeňka Macková, hezká holčina, někde zpívala, chtěla být operní zpěvačka, já jsem s ní jezdil domů, byli jsme přátelé. A oni ji posadili vedle Tomka, do lavice. A ona dostala záchvat, strašně plakala, že s ním sedět nemůže. Srdceryvně plakala. Vyměnil jsem si s ní místo, sedl jsem si k Tomkovi. Tomek se na mě pak trochu pověsil. On opravdu neuměl, každou chvíli chyběl, byl nemocný. Byl špatný v matematice, já jsem exceloval, půjčoval si ode mě sešity a snažil jsem se mu to vysvětlovat, co se v hodině vykládalo. Jednou si šel půjčit sešit ke mně na Vinohrady a tam dostal ten nápad, protože viděl vojenskou hlídku, jak jde od Olšanských hřbitovů, měli samopaly, a tak dostali nápad, že jí přepadne a zmocní se zbraně. A když ho chytli, tak takhle to přesně těm vyšetřovatelům řekl, že ho to napadlo, když si jel ode mě vypůjčit sešit. Tím pádem já jsem se dostal do strašnýho průseru.“ „To bylo v jaké době?“ „On ho zabil v roce 1952 toho Šmatlavu. Celý je to ujetý, protože bojovat proti režimu tím, že zastřelím vojáka prezenční služby, je nesmysl. On byl vytočený, protože v komunitě spolužáků byl vyloučený, holky se s ním nechtěly bavit. Teď ještě neuměl ve škole. Měl potřebu se nějak realizovat, být hrdina. Ovšem být hrdina tímto způsobem… V dnešní době by asi vyloupil banku, prodával drogy - chtěl udělat něco troufalého. Tak to bylo.“

“I was already about to leave (the USA), the apartment and everything was already sold and my stuff packed, and I was... well, not arrested, but asked to meet them. It was a joint meeting where the FBI and the CIA were present, there was certain Brown, the head of the intelligence in the CIA, and then the head of counterintelligence from the FBI from New York, a young guy. The made me a good offer. They said: ´We know that you work for the other side, but we will give you immunity if you start working for us, how about that?´ What was interesting was that they were asking me only about the period when I had been in the CIA, that is until 1976. They asked no questions about what was after that. They didn’t know about it, you understand? Thus it was probably Kalugin who had turned me in, because if Fiala had turned me in, they would have known everything. Or it was more complicated with Fiala, but that doesn’t matter. So we discussed it for about a week and they let me go home, so if I were smart enough, I would even be able to escape them. If I had had some forged passports somewhere in my safe. Since I'm a professional, I would have escaped them even if I had been under surveillance.”

“The situation there was interesting, because it was a maximum security prison located directly in New York, where people were awaiting trial. That was because Giuliani arrested whomever he could. They were the top heads of the mafia; really there were all the godfathers of the New York mafia there. Behind the bars there was Persico, the leader of the Colombo family, there was old Gambino and young Gambino, the topmost bosses, and they were immensely interesting people. Then there was some prominent Irish terrorist, so you were in an excellent company. Then there was Don Gaetano Badalamente, the boss of Italian mafia, whom the FBI lured from Palermo somewhere to Barcelona where they kidnapped him, a very interesting man. Those were the times when the mafia was not yet involved in drug trafficking, but they were exercising this medieval-like justice. It was actually a government. But I am very grateful to him and I will not say a word against him, because he really helped me. They treated me with great respect. Then there were other remarkable people... There were several extraordinary people, and it was an immensely great learning experience to meet them. Then there was the current boss of the Italian freemasons’ lodge P2, of the ultra neofascist rightwing, who is its leader up to now, and at that time he was nr. 2. It’s a long story, but this Franceso Pazienza was an immensely interesting man.”

“I was still trying to get to a position where I would not only have an opportunity to get some information, but where I would have the chance to actively learn something valuable and have an influence on the development of activities and strategies. I was working in the CIA quite successfully, and I eventually managed to attain this. In 1976 I was offered work in the office... It was basically a think tank, a small analytical research institute within the CIA structure, which served as the brain for their analysis. It was the most secret office, which had access to absolutely all CIA materials, and which was producing documents of even greater importance. I wrote a report of over hundred pages - I think I still have it somewhere – which discussed the assignment to get into the thinking of Soviet leaders and to find out the motives for their decisions, use examples from their personal histories to analyze them, and to determine whether they are pragmatical or ideological in their decision-making, what inclinations they have... similar investigations were carried out on Hitler during WWII. This was the top secret department, which meant the following: in order to get inside the CIA, you need to pass through many checkpoints. Then you take the elevator to their floor, pass through doors with coded access locks - every room had a coded access door in the CIA. I managed to get inside of all this, and get to the very top – and I reported it to Prague. That was when Kalugin intervened. What he achieved was that I was summoned to a meeting in Prague. He got scared. Kalugin, an American agent, got scared, because at that level, it was quite possible that I would find out about it. Or that I would be able to deduce who was sending the information to them. And I think he didn't dare to tell this to the Americans, because otherwise I would have been arrested immediately. If somebody had identified me, I would have been arrested and it would be then up to him. Because nobody else knew about me. Because Kalugin was the only Russian who had my materials. He solved it the same way he had done it with Schtschadrin, whom he had kidnapped and killed, whom he had probably killed by himself. Schtschadrin had also posed a personal threat to him, and he had been in a similar situation like me, working at the top level. And so I was called off to Prague, and everything was wonderful and everybody admired me, and then Kalugin appeared there and began to question me about some facts which I was not able to remember. His reaction was: ´You see?! He is not answering!´ He called me an enemy, who was working for the Americans and asked the intelligence service to get rid of me. He writes about it in his memoirs, where he exposed himself, and thus there is no doubt that it really was so. By the way, there is one more memoir, because Kalugin didn’t arrive alone to Prague; he allegedly came for a business trip with another person from the intelligence service. He was now after me. He wanted to meet me, he was asking about me, but he had been directly ordered by Andropov not to do it. This other guy writes that as soon as he heard it, he informed Andropov, that he phoned to Andropov from the Soviet embassy, and Andropov again forbade Kalugin to have any further contacts with me. Nevertheless, he still contacted me, and it is evident that he went against Andropov's order. Shortly after, Kalugin was kicked out from his position. I suspect that it might have been because of me, because he had disobeyed the order, because Andropov liked me quite well. But then he probably didn’t want to be involved in this, because the Czechs and Slovaks were autonomous to a certain extent, and he didn't really want to give orders to them. He didn’t want to turn them into enemies, and thus he left Köcher alone. So there I was in the villa near Benešov near Prague, and Kalugin told them that I was the enemy...”

“They find out about me and think what they ought to do with me. They were not into killing me. That would have been possible with Kalugin in the KGB, but it would hardly be possible in Czechoslovakia. The guy who was in charge of me in the American department, in the first administration, comes to me and says: ´Karel, we have wonderful news for you. You will not return to America, you will stay here. In two days you will appear in a press conference.´ – it was after the Minařík case – ´and you will testify about Havel and Tigrid and the people around them.´ That was couple of months before, the Charter was already being prepared, and in the first administration they must have known about it, because the community of people around the Charter was swarming with agents; in my opinion, at least half of the founders of the Charter were agents. ´You will simply accuse them.´ They were probably preparing some trial where they intended to charge Havel with high treason. It was even more complicated, because Tigrid was a CIA officer. I knew his boss. Obviously, I didn’t want to accuse Tigrid and Havel, especially Havel. And so I said to them: ´Well, arrest me then´ That was the final proof for them that I was an enemy for them. ´Come on, you got your parents here, your mom is here, you will get a car, a villa, you will become a hero, you are American, you are a traitor…´ This pressure lasted for some three days. Eventually – and it was quite a desperate situation because they didn’t know what to do with me, and I didn’t know how to get out of it, either – I began plying their game and I said: ´All right, so I'm this American agent, and obviously I had told these Americans where exactly I was going and where I would be, right? And if one of their CIA officers gets lost, that will be pretty bad. You will then get a war just like in the 1950s.´ And so they solved it this way: ´Pack your luggage!´ I packed my things and they drove me to the Ruzyně prison and told me to look at it. From there they took me to the Ruzyně airport and said: ´Fly there, and if you don’t break all your cooperation with the CIA immediately and start working against us, we will exterminate you in America. We can get hold of you there.´ They bypassed the passport control and led me to the airplane, returned my American passport to me and I flew off. And I resigned from the CIA immediately.”

"I missed Prague, and thus I asked them (my superiors in Prague) to do this as a favor for me. I wanted them to let me go to some organization or institution where I would be working under some special arrangement. After all those years I was able to arrive as a tourist, using my American passport. They didn’t approve it, but they had me come here and gave me a diplomatic passport and they didn’t restrict my movement in Prague, and thus I could pose as a tourist. It was good will on their part that they allowed me to come and go. They were generous in it, because at that time they didn’t yet have a clue what would be passing through Prague to Moscow. I tried to explain to Moscow that handling it this way was unsustainable, that they needed to find some modus vivendi, and reduce their nuclear armament and seek reciprocal measures from them. I was giving them guarantees that it was possible to negotiate with the Americans in good faith, that the enemies, the people around Reagan, were gone, and that those who were in power now would keep their word. And I was absolutely right in that. There was James Baker. They were sort of American conservative patriots, but they were very pragmatic. This Baker later befriended Shevardnadze, they were personal friends, and Reagan and Gorbatschow also became good friends. To explain that these two superpowers cannot go into conflict, but that they should rather divide the spheres of their interests, and if possible, leave out Eastern Europe and us from their plans, because this kind of empire was no longer possible in modern world. Because you can prove them that if the worst comes to the worst, the Americans would run them over. Economically and in terms of arms, because - it cannot be helped - the USA is indeed a more advanced society compared to the Soviet Union." Interviewer: "About the reports you were sending to Prague - these were mostly some analyses?" K. K.: "Yes, they were analyses based on very confidential information." Interviewer: "And you were getting the information from the people you knew?" K. K: "Certainly. They are very happy to talk to you about it, if you understand, of course they are. This way I learnt, for instance, that a preemptive attack on the Soviet Union was really being prepared. The deputy of one minister has really admitted it." Interviewer: "And when did this happen?" K. K.: "I think it was in 1983."